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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Aman Gas appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery with the intent to
commit a serious felony, rape. Mr. Gas was convicted following a jury trial and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. Mr. Gas
appeals and he asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the offense
of battery with the intent to commit rape, because that crime is not a lesser included
offense of the charged crime in this case, which is rape committed where the victim is
unconscious of the nature of the act. This Reply Brief addresses the State’s contention
that the battery committed with the intent to commit rape in this case was penetration.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gas’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by instructing the jury on battery with the intent to commit rape?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury On Battery With The Intent To
Commit Rape
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gas asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on battery with

the intent to commit rape because it was not a lesser included offense of rape as it was
charged in this case, and because the language of the jury instruction created a
variance with the charging document. This Reply Brief addresses the State’s contention
that the battery committed with the intent to commit rape in this case was penetration.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury On Battery With The Intent
To Commit Rape
The State asserts that penile penetration, without the victim’s consent, is

necessarily a battery, and “as a result rape cannot be accomplished without also
committing battery with the intent to commit rape. The only difference between battery
with the intent to commit rape and rape is that rape requires the penis to physically
penetrate the victims ‘oral, anal or vaginal opening,’ whereas any penile physical
contact short of penetration constitutes a battery with the intent to commit rape.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.10.) The State further asserts that Mr. Gas’s argument is based
on the ‘misplaced belief that penetration with a penis is somehow not a battery.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.14.) The State is incorrect.
Mr. Gas readily acknowledges that penetration with a penis without a person’s
consent is a battery. Mr. Gas’s argument is not based on the assertion that it is not a
battery. The argument is based on the fact that battery with the intent to commit rape
requires a battery that is distinct from the act of penetration.
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The State seems to

acknowledge that battery with the intent to commit rape requires an act other
penetration by its assertion that “any penile physical contact short of penetration
constitutes a battery with the intent to commit rape.” The problem with the State’s
argument is “penile physical contact short of penetration” is not an element of rape in
this circumstance.
“There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to
be a lesser included offense of a charged offense.” State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527
(2011) (citing State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1997)). One theory is referred to as
the “statutory theory.” Id. “Under this theory, one offense is not considered a lesser
included of another unless it is necessarily so under the statutory definition of the
crime.” Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980)). This Court applies
the Blockburger test, which originated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932), to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense under the statutory
theory. Id. (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 n.8 (1986).) “An offense will be
deemed to be a lesser included offense of another, greater offense, if all the elements
required to sustain a conviction of the lesser included offense are included within the
elements needed to sustain a conviction of the greater offense.” Id. (citing State v.
McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114 (1979)).
Applying the statutory theory in this case, the elements of rape are:
the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with
the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female under any one (1) of
the following circumstances:
[…]
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(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act. As used
in this section, “unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of
resisting because the victim meets one (1) of the following conditions:
(a) Was unconscious or asleep;
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred.
I.C. § 18-6101(6). Thus, the only physical act set forth in the statute is penetration, not
“penile physical contact short of penetration.”
The other theory is called the “pleading theory.” Flegel, 151 Idaho at 523. (citing
Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524). “This theory holds ‘that an offense is an included offense if it
is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a means or element of the commission of
the higher offense.’” Id. (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986)). Battery with
the intent to commit rape is not the means by which Mr. Gas was alleged to have
committed the crime of rape. Mr. Gas was charged as follows:
That the said AMAN FARAH GAS, County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on
or about the 20th day of January, 2013, did penetrate with his penis the
anal opening of a female person, [R.G.], who at the time was unconscious
of the nature of the act and this was known to the defendant.
(R., p.75.) The charging document does not allege a battery separate from penetration
or “penile physical contact short of penetration.”
The State’s argument seems to be based on the premise that it, in order to
commit the act of penetration, a person must also commit “penile physical contact short
of penetration.” This, however, is not the standard. There are only two theories, the
statutory and pleading theories, and battery with the intent to commit rape does not
qualify as a lesser included offense under either theory. Penetration is the only act
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required by statute in this case, and penetration was the only act alleged in the charging
document.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gas requests that this conviction for battery with the intent to commit rape be
vacated and his case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2016.

_____/S/____________________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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